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This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between
1998 and 2002. It documents the seller’s use of discretion and its inﬂuence on auction out-
comes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion fre-
quently and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves
up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bid-
ders do not make proﬁts in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reﬂect
the uncertainty created by the seller’s discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit
auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implica-
tion that the market-clearing price depends on the seller’s marginal cost rather than on the
submitted demand.
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This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between
1998 and 2002. German Treasury Auctions diﬀer in a qualitative manner from auctions in
other countries: The bidders are allowed to submit both competitive and non-competitive bids
without quantity restrictions. The competitive demand accounts for almost 70% of the total
demand, while 30% comes from non-competitive bidders. This is diﬀerent from Treasury
auctions in other countries and in particular in the United States where non-competitive
demand is typically never higher than a very small percentage. The seller has considerable
discretion in deciding how to allocate the securities. In particular, the seller can determine
after the submission of bids the amount to set aside for sales in the secondary market and
the extent to which non-competitive bids are ﬁlled. This paper documents the seller’s use of
discretion and its inﬂuence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests
that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially. Allocations to competitive
bidders amount only to about 50% of the total allocations in German Treasury auctions,
whereas the rest is allocated to non-competitive bidders and secondary market operations.
The seller does not maximize revenues in a given auction, but sets the auction price on
average equal to the market price. Neither the seller nor the bidders make proﬁts in German
auctions on average, while the bidders’ strategies reﬂect the uncertainty created by the seller’s
discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit auction model by Lengwiler (1999).
The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication that the seller chooses the market-
clearing price based on the its marginal cost, which is the market price on the auction day,
rather than on the submitted demand.
The paper conﬁrms and extends the empirical evidence from other countries that investors
incorporate the uncertainty in the markets into their bidding decisions. When the uncertainty
in the markets increase, more potential bidders abstain from bidding, bidders submit rela-
tively more demand in the non-competitive tender, and competitive bidders demand less, bid
at lower prices, and increase the dispersion of their bids.Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Ergebnisse von 93 Auktionen deutscher Bundeswert-
papiere in der Zeit von 1998 bis 2002. Diese Auktionen unterscheiden sich qualitativ von den
Auktionen in anderen Staaten: Bieter d¨ urfen sowohl limitierte als auch unlimitierte Gebote
abgeben. Die Nachfrage aus limitierten Geboten betr¨ agt etwa 70% der Nachfrage, w¨ ahrend
30% auf unlimitierte Gebote entf¨ allt. Dies unterscheidet sich deutlich von der Zusammenset-
zung der Nachfrage in anderen Staaten wie den USA, wo die Nachfrage aus unlimitierten
Geboten nur einen geringen Anteil aufweist. Der Emittent hat betr¨ achtlichen Spielraum bei
der Zuteilung der Wertpapiere. Er kann nach Sichtung der abgegebenen Gebote ¨ uber die H¨ ohe
der Zuteilung an unlimitierte Gebote und der Marktpﬂegequote entscheiden. Diese Studie
analysiert, wie der Emittent bei der Zuteilung der Wertpapiere seinen Spielraum anwendet
und wie sich sein Verhalten auf die Ergebnisse der Auktionen und die Bietstrategien der In-
vestoren auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Emittent seinen Spielraum h¨ auﬁg und in
betr¨ achtlichen Umfang wahrnimmt. Nur etwa 50% aller Zuteilungen entfallen auf limitierte
Gebote, w¨ ahrend der Rest unlimitierten Geboten und der Marktpﬂegequote vorbehalten ist.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Emittent keine kurzfristige Optimierung be-
treibt, sondern den Auktionspreis im Durchschnitt gleich dem Marktpreis setzt. Weder Emit-
tent noch Bieter erzielen daher im Durchschnitt Gewinne in den Auktionen deutscher Bun-
deswertpapiere, wobei die Investoren die Einﬂussnahme des Emittenten in ihren Bietstrate-
gien ber¨ ucksichtigen. Diese Studie erweitert und testet das Modell von Lengwiler (1999). Die
Ergebnisse sind konsistent mit der aus dem Modell abgeleiteten Implikation, dass sich der
Auktionspreis in erster Linie nach den Grenzkosten des Emittenten, d.h. dem Marktpreis am
Auktionstag, und weniger nach dem Bietverhalten der Investoren bestimmt.
Die Studie best¨ atigt und erweitert die Erkenntnisse aus anderen Staaten dar¨ uber, wie
Bieter auf Unsicherheit im Markt reagieren. Bei Zunahme der Unsicherheit im Markt nehmen
weniger Bieter an Auktionen teil. Teilnehmende Bieter erh¨ ohen den Anteil unlimitierter
Gebote, reduzieren Nachfragemenge und -preis und erh¨ ohen die Spreizung ihrer Gebote.Table of Contents
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Evidence from German Treasury Auctions1
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the seller’s use of discretion in discriminatory Treasury auctions in Ger-
many and its inﬂuence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. It examines the results of
93 discriminatory auctions conducted by the German government between 1998 and 2002.2
Most governments retain considerable discretion in the conduct of auctions: they reserve
the right to change the auction format, the amount and type of securities to be sold, and the
type of actions that can be taken in the primary and secondary markets after the completion
of the auction.3 Auctions of government securities in Germany are no exception to this.
But they diﬀer in a qualitative manner from auctions in other countries: The seller actively
exercises its discretion in all of the auctions and has considerable discretion in deciding how to
allocate the securities. In particular, the seller can determine after the submission of bids the
amount to set aside for sales in the secondary market and the extent to which non-competitive
bids are ﬁlled. The seller uses both types of discretion frequently and substantially.
How does the seller use its discretion and how does it inﬂuence the auction outcomes and
the bidding strategies? The evidence in this paper suggests that the seller does not maximize
revenues in a given auction, but moves up in the competitive demand curve and sets the
market clearing price equal to the market price on average. Therefore, bidders do not make
proﬁts in German auctions, which stands in contrast to the signiﬁcantly positive underpricing
1I am grateful to Laurie Simon Hodrick, Charles Jones, and Suresh Sundaresan for their invaluable support
and comments and seminar participants at Columbia, Deutsche Bundesbank, UNC Chapel Hill, and the
College of William & Mary Batten Conference. I owe a special thank to the Deutsche Bundesbank for their
hospitality and data as well as to the BaFin for their data. I retain responsibility for any errors and the views
expressed in this paper. The author can be reached at Campus Box 3490, McColl Building; Chapel Hill, NC
27599; e-mail: jorg rocholl@unc.edu
2German Treasury securities have been exclusively sold in auctions since 1998.
3For example, the U.S. Treasury introduced uniform-price auctions for 2-year and 5-year notes in 1992.
1in other countries including the U.S.4 At the same time, the seller’s discretion introduces a
source of uncertainty. Bidders react to this uncertainty by bidding more cautiously in those
auctions in which the seller’s discretion is expected to be strongest. The paper also conﬁrms
and extends the evidence on the champion’s plague.5 Uncertainty in the market increases the
level of bid-shading: More potential bidders abstain from bidding, bidders submit relatively
more demand in the non-competitive tender, and competitive bidders demand less, bid at
lower prices, and increase the dispersion of their bids.
The research on Treasury auctions has grown substantially over the last years.6 Central
banks have been willing to share sensitive data on demand and allocation in their Treasury
auctions. This has permitted researchers to address a number of testable implications of the
auction theory, such as the bidders’ adjustment to the champion’s plague and their response
to an increase in uncertainty. Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002), Hortacsu (2002),
Bjonnes (2001), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), and Simon (1994) are some examples of
such research. Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2004) are the ﬁrst to explore the eﬀect
of the seller’s discretion on auction outcomes and bidding strategies.7 They show that the
Finnish Treasury, which never pre-announces the supply in its uniform price auctions, acts
strategically in a repeated game and never selects supply to maximize revenue in a given
auction.
This paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the seller’s discretion in discriminatory auctions. It
documents the seller’s use of discretion and its inﬂuence on auction outcomes and bidding
strategies. The paper extends the model by Lengwiler (1999) and tests its empirical impli-
cations. The seller strategically varies supply to set the auction clearing price equal to its
marginal cost. Consequently, bidders’ proﬁts are equal to zero on average. The auction pro-
cedure is not optimal, since it induces bidders to shade their bids. The extension of the model
4Goldreich (2003) documents underpricing in both discriminatory and uniform-price U.S. Treasury Auc-
tions.
5Ausubel (1997) refers to the winner’s curse in multi-unit auctions as ”champion’s plague”.
6A number of survey articles including Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997), Bikhchandani and Huang (1993),
Das and Sundaram (1996), and Nandi (1997) provides a useful summary of the existing evidence.
7McAdams (2000) and Back and Zender (2001) analyze discretion in collusive uniform-price auctions.
2incorporates secondary market operations and non-competitive demand and shows how their
existence changes the predictions for the seller’s and the bidders’ optimal behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the institutional features of
German Treasury markets. Section III provides an overview of the auction results. Section
IV introduces and extends the theory of multi-unit auctions with variable supply. Section V
tests the empirical implications by considering the determinants for both the seller’s use of
discretion and the investors’ demand behavior. Section VI concludes.
2 The German Treasury Market
First the duties of the agents in the German government’s debt management are illustrated.
Then an overview of German Treasury securities, auctions, and markets is given.8
2.1 Debt management
The Deutsche Bundesbank served as the German public sector’s ﬁscal agent in the sample pe-
riod.9 Its traditional functions comprised the issuance of securities, the conduct of secondary
market operations, and related counselling and coordination services. In September 2000,
the Federal Ministry of Finance set up the ”Federal Republic of Germany - Finance Agency
GmbH”. The Agency started its operations in June 2001, and subsequently most functions
were transferred from the Deutsche Bundesbank to the Agency. For example, the Agency sets
the auction price, the amount set aside for secondary market operations and the allocations to
non-competitive demand. The Deutsche Bundesbank still conducts the auctions for German
Treasury securities, on behalf of the Agency and for the account of the Federal Government.
Since the ﬁrst half of 2002, the Agency has sold the amounts set aside for secondary market
8The following description considers the status at the end of the sample period in June 2002. Any
subsequent changes are not considered.
9This summary follows the Deutsche Bundesbank’s description in Chapter 5 of its Annual Report 2002.
3operations through Eurex Bonds, the electronic trading system of Deutsche B¨ orse AG.10 In
the remainder of the paper, the agents are grouped together and referred to as seller.
2.2 Securities and bidders
German government securities known as Bunds (with an initial maturity of ten or thirty
years), Bobls (ﬁve years), Sch¨ atze (two years), and Bubills (half a year) have been sold
exclusively in auctions since the beginning of 1998. All securities except for Bubills are listed
after the auction. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the securities. The seller may sell
new securities or additional amounts of securities that already exist in the secondary market.
The latter practice is known as reopening. Table 1 shows the breakdown of new and reopened
auctions. Out of 93 total auctions, 67 are auctions of new securities and the remainder
are reopenings of existing securities. Reopenings are more common for longer maturities:
Whereas Bubills are not reopened in the sample period, 10-year Bunds are reopened up to
two times. The number of auctions ﬁrst decreased over time from a high of 22 in year 1998
to 17 in year 2001, then the number increased again in the ﬁrst half of 2002.
Only authorized members of the Bund Issues Auction Group are allowed to submit bids.
Members are credit institutions, securities trading houses and trading banks.11 To remain
a member of the Bund Issues Auction Group, bidders’ allocations have to exceed 0.05% of
the total issue amounts in each year. Allocations are weighted with the following factors: 1
for Bubills, 4 for Sch¨ atze, 8 for Bobls, 15 for 10-year Bunds, and 25 for 30-year Bunds. If
bidders do not reach the critical level, they will be excluded.12 The number of members of
the Bund Issues Auction Group has decreased from 72 in 1998 to 59 in 1999, 46 in 2000, and
42 in 2001, which is also the number at the end of the sample period. The main reason is
that small members failed to reach the critical level of allocations.13 Consequently, as Table
10The Deutsche Bundesbank still conducts the sales through the regional German stock exchanges.
11In each year members are ranked by the aggregate amounts of their allocations. Their names and ranks
are made publicly available, but not their allotted volume. The rankings are published both on the Agency’s
webpage and in the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Annual Report.
12In principle they can rejoin later, but this has not occurred yet.
13Consolidation among the bidding institutions has resulted in 7 members leaving the Bund Issues Auction
43 will show, the overall bidding volume has not been negatively aﬀected by the decrease in
the number of bidders. The bidders’ average placement power has increased over time.14
Bidders abstain from bidding in many auctions, which leads to a considerable variation
in the number of bidders across the auctions, from a low of 19 to a high of 71. More bidders
are drawn to the intermediate and longer end of the maturity in the auctions.15 When
bidders participate, they actively use the opportunity to bid in the competitive and in the
non-competitive sector simultaneously.16
2.3 Auctions
The auctions are discriminatory and bidders may submit sealed, multiple bids. Bidders
may bid both in the competitive and in the non-competitive tender.17 The price that non-
competitive bidders have to pay is the weighted average of the winning competitive bids.
There is no upper limit on the number of bids that bidders may submit in the competitive
tender and there is no maximum amount that bidders may demand in the non-competitive
tender. The latter stands in contrast to auctions in the United States, as well as the fact
that non-competitive bids may or may not be ﬁlled completely. The level of completion
depends on the relation between the total supply of securities, the bidders’ total demand,
and the amount that the seller decides to set aside for secondary market operations.18 Also
in contrast to auctions in the United States, there is no formal restriction on the maximum
Group over the sample period.
14An alternative hypothesis is that bidders withdraw because they do not like the auction mechanism. This
is hard to reconcile with the robust overall demand and the fact that twelve new bidders have applied and
been admitted over the sample period.
15Whereas on average 27 bidders participate in auctions for Bubills, 49 bidders participate in auctions for
10-year Bunds.
16The average number of total bidders is 42 and not much higher than the average of 32 for competitive or
31 for non-competitive bidders.
17For Bunds, Bobls, and Sch¨ atze price bids are made in full 0.01 percentage points, and for Bubills in full
0.005 percentage points. The amount bid must be at least EUR 1 million, or a multiple integral thereof.
18In the analysis of bidding schedules, researchers are potentially confronted with an Errors-In-Variable
problem. Bidders may submit bids that are unrealistically high or low. As an example, Nyborg, Rydqvist,
and Sundaresan (2002) report bids in Swedish Treasury auctions with an annual yield of 99.99%. This is not
an issue in German Treasury auctions, as in these cases the seller asks bidders to conﬁrm their bids. For this
reason, there are no unrealistic bids in the data.
5allocation to one bidder. The lack of a quantity restriction and the uncertainty whether the
non-competitive demand will be completely ﬁlled are unique to German auctions.
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline on the auction day. Investors electronically submit bids
until 11:00 am. The seller then determines the auction price, the relative allocations to
competitive and non-competitive bids, and the amount to set aside for secondary market
operations. Bidders are informed of their awards between 11:05 am and 11:10 am. Securities
are traded throughout the auction day, ﬁrst in the when-issued market and then, after the
release of the auction results, in the secondary market. The securities are listed at Deutsche
B¨ orse at 1:00 pm on the auction day.19 Then the seller starts its secondary market operations.
2.4 When-issued and secondary market
German Treasury securities are traded both over-the-counter and at stock exchanges. German
and non-EU credit and ﬁnancial institutions are obliged to report each trade in securities
to the Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) in Frankfurt.20 The BaFin
provided data on intra-day transactions in each auctioned security on the auction day between
1998 and 2002. For each transaction, the data specify the type of the security by its ISIN,
the exact time of the trade with a precision of a second, its volume and price, and whether
the reporting institution bought or sold the security. The name of the reporting institution
is not indicated.
There are 26,975 transactions reported to the BaFin for the 93 auction days. 596 of them
do not have a time stamp and are excluded for this reason. Among the remaining 26,379
transactions, there are 5,203 double entries in which both the seller and the buyer reported
the transaction.21 So the ﬁnal number of transactions amounts to 21,176.22 Deutsche B¨ orse
19Until 1999 they were listed two days after the auction day. In 2000 two securities were listed one day
after the auction day because of technical diﬃculties.
20The details are described in paragraph 9 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG).
21A double entry is given for those two transactions for which the time, the volume, and the price of the
trade exactly coincide and the selling variable is ”buy” for the one and ”sell” for the other.
22It is not possible to determine what fraction of the total market these transactions represent.
6AG provided data on secondary market transactions in Bunds, Bobls, and Sch¨ atze between
1999 and 2002. Data for 1998 are not available. Since Bubills are not listed, data on their
transactions are not available for any of the sample years. Panel 1) of Table 2 shows that
transactions at Deutsche B¨ orse AG are completely reported to the BaFin and that they only
represent a tiny fraction of all transactions in German Treasury securities. The total yearly
number of transactions in German Treasury securities on the auction day reﬂects the number
of auctions per year: It had ﬁrst decreased from a high of 7,158 in 1998 to a low of 3,615 in
2001, before it increased again in the ﬁrst half of 2002.
The average transaction volume at Deutsche B¨ orse is relatively small. It amounts to EUR
8.12 million in comparison to EUR 29.33 million for the average volume of all transactions
reported to the BaFin. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant for the whole period, as well
as for each sample year except for 2002. Panel 2) of Table 2 shows that the average number
of transactions in German Treasury securities on the auction day amounts to 227.7. This
number increases with the duration of the security, except for the slight decrease for 30-year
Bunds. Whereas there are on average only 12.5 reported transactions for Bubills, there are
more than 400 transactions for both 10-year and 30-year Bunds. At the same time, the mean
volume per trade decreases monotonically with the security’s duration. The average daily
trading volume on the auction day is lowest for Bubills with EUR 958.1 million and highest
for the 10-year Bunds with EUR 10,164.6 million. The average volume for Sch¨ atze amounts
to EUR 7,504.9 million, for Bobls to EUR 6,119.6 million, and for 30-year Bunds to EUR
8,303.0 million.
3 Outcome of German Treasury auctions
3.1 Demand and Allocation
Table 3 provides an overview of the demand and allocation schedules in German Treasury
auctions. The competitive demand accounts for almost 70% of the total demand of EUR
71,318,546 million, while 30% comes from non-competitive bidders. This is qualitatively dif-
ferent from Treasury auctions in the United States where non-competitive demand is typically
never higher than a very small percentage.23 Furthermore, in contrast to U.S. Treasury auc-
tions, both competitive and non-competitive bidders face substantial uncertainty about the
fraction of their demand that will be allocated. As the allocation data in Table 3 show,
the bidders receive much less than what they demand in the auctions. Whereas the non-
competitive demand amounts to EUR 406,873 million, the allocations are substantially lower
at EUR 188,902 million. In the extreme case, non-competitive bidders only receive 15% of
their demand. Non-competitive bidders still receive a higher relative allocation than com-
petitive bidders whose demand and allocation amount to EUR 911,673 million and EUR
280,710 million, respectively. Another unique feature of German auctions is the fact that the
seller determines (after the bidding) the amount to set aside for secondary market operations
(SMO). This amount has varied between EUR 15 billion and EUR 20 billion per year, which
represents between 10% and 18% of the total supply per year.
In sum and in strict contrast to the U.S., allocations to competitive bidders amount only
to slightly more than 50% of the total allocations in German Treasury auctions, whereas
34.1% and 15.3% are allocated to non-competitive bidders and secondary market operations,
respectively. This feature will be of key interest to the analysis in this paper. How does the
seller use its discretion and how does it change the outcome of the auctions?
3.2 Pricing
The ﬁgures detailed herein show that the seller in German Treasury auctions makes substan-
tial use of its discretion in determining the market-clearing price and the allocations. The
open question is how the seller uses its discretion in the repeated interaction with investors:
Does the seller behave opportunistically or as a long-term maximizer?
If the seller in German Treasury auctions was a one-shot maximizer, it could maximize
23As an example, the average non-competitive demand in the ﬁve auctions for 10-year Notes in the U.S. in
2003 amounts to 0.43% of the overall demand (http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/of10year2003.htm).
8its revenues by allocating only to the most aggressive competitive bidders and allocating
the remaining supply to non-competitive bidders. This is a realistic opportunity in German
Treasury auctions for two reasons: 1) Non-competitive demand represents a substantial share
of the overall demand. 2) In 87 of the 93 auctions the highest competitive bid is higher
than the price in the secondary or when-issued market at the time of bidding. The average
diﬀerence amounts to 6.04 basis points and is highly signiﬁcant (t-statistic: 5.65).
In 90 of the 93 auctions, the seller does not choose the highest competitive bid as the
auction price, including all the auctions in which there is suﬃcient non-competitive demand.
In none of the remaining three auctions the bidders incur a loss, as the highest competitive
bid is below the market price. Instead of maximizing proﬁts in a given auction, the seller
chooses an auction price that is close to the market price. Figure 2 illustrates the frequency
of bidders’ proﬁts in all 93 auctions. The seller sets the auction price equal to the market
price at 11:00 am in 37 auctions. 23 further auctions are priced within a diﬀerence of 1 basis
point from the market price. This means that about two-thirds of the auctions are priced
within the range of [-1,1] basis points around the market price. Figure 2 also shows that
larger negative and larger positive proﬁts become increasingly improbable.
Bidders’ proﬁts are analyzed more formally by considering the transactions in German
Treasury securities on the auction day. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) show that the liquidity
on auction days may vary substantially and that implications about the level of underpricing
therefore have to be considered with caution. Transactions around three events deserve
particular interest: a) the bidding deadline at 11:00 am, b) the release time, and c) the end of
the trading day. Panel 1) of Table 4 reports the number of transactions and the underpricing
at diﬀerent time windows around these events. Underpricing is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the market price of the security at the indicated time and the auction-clearing price.
As shown before, the market for German treasury securities is fairly liquid and the liquidity
increases with maturity, with the Bubills being least liquid. For the other securities the
number of transactions increases after the bidding deadline at 11:00 am. The markets become
most liquid after the release of the auction results. For the purpose of illustration, it is helpful
9to review the trading intensity for 10-year Bunds. Whereas there are 81 transactions within
ﬁve minutes before the bidding deadline, this number increases to 143 in the ﬁve-minute
period thereafter. It increases substantially after the release time, with 509 transactions
within the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes and another 827 transactions in the following ﬁve minutes. This
results in a total number of 1,336 transactions in the 10-minute window following the release
of the results. With 27 auctions for 10-year Bunds, this translates into an average of about
50 transactions per auction within these ten minutes.
Panel 2) of Table 4 shows that the average underpricing for all 93 auction days is statis-
tically insigniﬁcant at any of the observed times. The same holds for each duration, except
for the signiﬁcantly negative proﬁts for 10-year Bunds at the release time. This stands in
contrast to the evidence for other countries including the United States, as documented by
Goldreich (2003). The ﬁgures show that the seller in German Treasury auctions sets the
auction price equal to the market price on average.
4 Multi-Unit Auction Theory with Variable Supply
In German Treasury Auctions bidders are allowed to submit both competitive and non-
competitive bids and the seller can allocate to these as well as to secondary market operations.
This provides substantial ﬂexibility for both the bidders and the seller, but it also creates an
additional source of uncertainty for the bidders. Apart from the uncertainty about the value
of the security, they face the uncertainty about the exact pricing and allocation rules in any
given auction. The subsequent model derives empirical implications for the seller’s and the
bidders’ behavior.
4.1 Basic model
The model uses the general framework of Lengwiler (1999) with a monopolistic seller in
multi-unit auctions that can strategically vary the auction supply. This is a common feature
10in many auctions, even in auctions with a pre-announced supply as in German Treasury
auctions. Although the seller announces the auction volume before the auction, it reserves
the right to retain a certain amount or, equivalently, to allocate a certain amount to itself.
First, the framework of Lengwiler (1999) is brieﬂy reviewed. A unique seller can produce
arbitrary quantities of the auctioned good at a marginal cost β. The distribution of β is
common knowledge, but only the seller knows its realization. In the ﬁrst stage, each bidder
i indicates the quantities yi and xi he is willing to buy at the two possible prices ph and
pl, where ph > pl and yi < xi. In the second stage, the seller decides about its response
π ∈ {pl,ph,cancel}. If the seller chooses ph, the bidder has to pay phyi for yi units. If the
seller chooses pl, the bidder has to pay phyi + pl(xi − yi) for a total of xi units. If the seller
cancels the auction, the bidder pays nothing and does not receive any units. The seller’s
best response is to cancel the auction if ph ≤ β, choose ph if pl ≤ β ≤ ph, and choose pl
if β ≤ pl. This means that the market clearing price should be independent of the bidding
strategies and should be primarily guided by the marginal cost of delivering an extra unit of
supply. This auction format is not eﬃcient, as bidders take into account the seller’s proﬁt
maximizing behavior and misreport their true demand di(p). Whereas they report their true
demand at the low price, they understate their true demand at the high price: xi = di(pl)
and yi ≤ di(ph).
Three main assumptions in the Lengwiler (1999) framework deserve a comment. First, the
assumption of a concave valuation function for securities and the resulting strictly decreasing
demand curve is consistent with the empirical evidence in this and in other papers. Second,
the assumption of a ﬁnite grid with two prices is motivated by its tractability. The main
results in Lengwiler (1999) as well in this paper do not change for a less restrictive grid.
Third, the seller in Treasury auctions can be assumed to be better informed than the investors
about the realization of β, since it can extract information not only from the when-issued
market, but also from investors’ demand curves.
114.2 Treasury auctions with Secondary Market Operations
The supply in Treasury auctions is determined by the government’s liquidity needs. Since
the seller has to raise a certain amount to ﬁll these, its auction supply is a function of more
than the submitted bids. The seller has to sell a pre-announced supply S, but it can allocate
part of this to itself and sell it in the secondary market.24 Secondary market operations m
are thus an implicit part of the basic model. Without non-competitive demand, they amount
to S -
P
yi or S -
P
xi, depending on the seller’s price choice. There are four empirical
implications.
Empirical implication 1: The amount allocated to secondary market operations de-
creases with the bidders’ aggressiveness.
The seller chooses the auction price by considering its marginal cost of supply β. With
a given β, the more demand bidders submit at prices at or above β, the more the seller can
allocate to them. In turn, the remaining supply that is allocated to m decreases.
Empirical implication 2: The seller increases the oﬀer price with higher allocations to
secondary market operations.
With a downward-sloping demand curve and a pre-announced supply S, the seller can
move along the demand curve by varying m. The more the seller allocates to m, the higher
is the point on the demand curve where it can set the price.
Empirical implication 3: The seller’s proﬁts in the auction are independent of the level
of allocations to secondary market operations.25
A key implication of the model is that the market-clearing price p should be the marginal
cost of delivering an extra unit of supply. This implies that the seller chooses p so that it
is as close as possible to its marginal cost β. The diﬀerence between p and β is therefore
24This is how the seller in German Treasury auctions uses secondary market operations. It is important
to note that these are not used for monetary policy. The responsibilities for ﬁscal and monetary policy are
strictly separated in Germany.
25The seller’s overall proﬁts might still be lower for m > 0 because of transaction costs for the part of the
auction supply sold in the secondary market.
12independent of the remaining supply S -
P
yi or S -
P
xi. What is the marginal cost in
Treasury auctions? With auctions that are reopened, it is the secondary market price of the
security. With new auctions it is the price of the security in the when-issued market.
Empirical implication 4: The seller’s proﬁts are independent of the competitive bids.
The seller’s behavior depends only on its unit costs and is therefore independent of the
bids. If the seller is interested in setting the auction price p equal to its marginal cost β, the
diﬀerence between the two should not depend on any bid characteristics, as for example bid
shading or demand volume and elasticity.26
The four empirical implications are derived from the basic model, in which there is no
non-competitive demand. The introduction of non-competitive demand into the basic model




ni and the given parameters from the basic model, a pre-
announced supply S, competitive demand
P
xi at pl and
P
yi at ph, and allocations to









ni + m, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ m < S.
The last inequality is strict to rule out non-auction selling mechanisms.
With the introduction of non-competitive demand, the possibility for the seller to use
its discretion increases substantially. Without non-competitive demand, the seller optimally
chooses an auction price equal to its marginal cost. With non-competitive demand, the seller’s
optimal behavior changes.
Proposition 1: If the seller wants to maximize its proﬁts in a given auction with suﬃcient
non-competitive demand, it chooses the high price, unless ph ≤ β.
26Bid shading is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the price in the when-issued market (for new auctions)
or in the secondary market (for re-opened auctions) at the time of bidding and the weighted average of all
bids (including the losing bids) submitted by the bidders.
13Proof: Consider ﬁrst the case with suﬃcient competitive and non-competitive demand:
P




yi ≥ S. If the seller chooses the high price and sells the rest to non-
competitive bidders, its proﬁt is (ph − β)
P
yi + (ph − β)(S -
P
yi), as the non-competitive
bidders pay the weighted-average price of the winning competitive bids. If it chooses the low
price, its proﬁt is (ph−β)
P
yi + (pl −β)(S -
P
yi). The optimal reply function for the seller
is to cancel the auction for ph ≤ β and to pick ph in the two other cases, as ph ≥ pl.





yi ≥ S, but
P
xi ≤ S, the seller’s proﬁt from choosing
the high price is again (ph − β)
P
yi + (ph − β)(S -
P
yi). The proﬁt from choosing the low
price depends on the share of the allocation to non-competitive bidders
P
ni. If (S -
P
xi) is
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xi . If (S -
P
xi) is sold completely through secondary









xi)(β−β), where it is assumed that the seller does not face liquidity costs for selling
the amounts set aside for secondary market operations. Apart from the pure strategies, the
seller can also use mixed strategies by allocating the remaining supply partly to
P
ni and
partly to m. The proﬁts from any of these strategies are strictly lower than the proﬁts from
picking the high price, as the realizable prices are lower than ph for the allocations exceeding
P
yi.
The seller’s behavior in a one-shot game with non-competitive demand does not uniquely
depend on its unit costs any more. The higher the demand relative to the auction size, the
higher the seller can set the price and the more proﬁts it can make.
Proposition 2: The seller’s proﬁts depend on the sum of non-competitive demand and





yi ≥ S, the seller’s proﬁt amounts to (ph − β)
P
yi + (ph − β)(S -
P
yi), if it does not have to cancel the auction for the case ph ≤ β. The market-clearing price




yi < S, the seller has to allocate (S -
P
yi)




xi, and m. Unless ph = β, any combination will result in lower





The seller’s optimal behavior changes, since it can use the combination of non-competitive
demand and demand at the high price to charge higher prices for non-competitive bids than
for bids at the low price. This demonstrates the attractiveness of non-competitive bids to the
seller. The change in the seller’s optimal behavior also changes the bidders’ optimal behavior.
Proposition 3: Bidders optimally react by depriving the seller of its discretion and not
submitting non-competitive demand and demand at the high price at the same time.
Proof: With
P
ni = 0 and
P
yi > 0, the predictions for the basic model apply. The seller
chooses a price equal to its marginal cost, and the bidders pay their bids. With
P
ni > 0 and
P
yi = 0, the price for
P
ni will always be pl and bidders receive non-competitive allocations
at the lowest possible price. With
P
ni > 0 and
P
yi > 0, the bidders incur losses on their
non-competitive bids, as shown in the Proof for Proposition 2.
Bidders rationally foresee the seller’s use of discretion and react by shading their bids.
For the seller, discretion therefore comes at the cost of a downward biased demand curve.
4.4 Treasury auctions as a repeated game
As an alternative to submitting bids in Treasury auctions, bidders can always buy Treasury
securities for a price of β in the secondary market shortly after the auction. This is therefore
the maximum price that a seller in a repeated game can, at least on average, choose in the
auction. Otherwise bidders would incur losses and abstain from bidding in future auctions.
The price for allocations to non-competitive bidders can therefore not exceed β on average.
The proﬁt might still be positive or negative in a given auction, as it might not be possible
for the seller to set the market price always equal to the auction price. With weak competitive
and non-competitive demand, it might face a liquidity constraint for the use of secondary
market operations and therefore have to choose a lower price. The choice of a lower price in
27But the seller’s proﬁts are still higher than its proﬁts in the case without non-competitive demand.
15these auctions could be compensated by the choice of a higher price in those auctions in which
a high non-competitive demand allows the seller to use its discretion. This raises the question
whether proﬁts are neutral or positively related to the amount of non-competitive demand.
In the ﬁrst case, the predictions from the basic model do not change. The seller chooses
the market clearing price in the same way as before, and the seller’s proﬁts are independent
of the amount of non-competitive bidding. In the second case, the seller uses its discretion,
and proﬁts are positively related to the amount of non-competitive demand. Under the null
hypothesis of the ﬁrst case this leads to the following empirical implication.
Empirical implication 5: The seller’s proﬁts are independent of the amount of non-
competitive bids.
How do bidders optimally react in the two cases? In the ﬁrst case, the seller uses the
non-competitive bids in the same way as the secondary market operations. Non-competitive
bids represent an insurance against the champion’s plague, as they prevent bidders from
overpaying, in particular in auctions with high uncertainty. As a result, bidders understate
their true demand at the high price as before, but do not behave diﬀerently in large and small
auctions.
In the second case, non-competitive demand hurts bidders as it increases the seller’s
discretion. The model provides implications for the bidders’ optimal behavior in this case.









yi are not in the bidders’ information
set at the time of bidding, as bidders are only aware of their own demand. They do know
S as announced before the auction. As a direct consequence from Proposition 2, the seller’s
expected proﬁts decrease with S. This implies, in combination with Proposition 3, that bidders
will bid more cautiously in smaller auctions if the seller uses non-competitive demand to
increase its proﬁts. This stands in strict contrast to the empirical ﬁndings for discriminatory
auctions in other countries in which the seller has no discretion. A decrease in auction size
in these countries has no, and if any a positive, impact on bidders’ demand volume. Under
the null hypothesis of proﬁt neutrality this leads to the following empirical implication.
16Empirical implication 6: The bidders’ aggressiveness is independent of the auction
size.
5 Testing Multi-Unit Auction Theory with Variable
Supply
This section analyzes the previous empirical implications in the context of German Treasury
auctions. First, evidence is presented on the determinants of the seller’s discretion in alloca-
tion and pricing. Second, it is tested whether and how investors take into account the seller’s
discretion in their demand behavior.
5.1 Evidence for the seller’s use of discretion
This section analyzes the question how the seller uses secondary market operations and
allocations to non-competitive demand.
5.1.1 Secondary Market Operations
Implication 1 states that secondary market operations should reach a higher level with a
decrease in the bidders’ aggressiveness. One measure of the bidder’s aggressiveness is their
demand volume in each single auction. For the empirical test, ﬁrst the amount set aside for
secondary market operations is divided by the total supply in each auction. This variable is
then regressed on some control variables and on the money demand in each auction as the
proxy for the strength of demand.
The results in Table 5 show that the share of secondary market operations is indeed higher
in auctions with weak overall demand and in particular with weak competitive demand.28
This suggests that the seller ramps up the demand curve by the use of secondary market
28In this and in the following regressions, the sample does not include the auctions for Bubills, since
secondary market operations are not used for Bubills.
17operations in auctions in which only a relatively low price would be achievable without their
use. The share of secondary market operations also increases with the auction size. This
suggests that demand elasticity, although high, is not high enough to assure the seller the
expected price in auctions with large supply. Without discretion, the seller would need to
accept lower bids and therefore lower the auction price in these auctions. The use of secondary
market operations helps the seller to avoid this.
Next the impact of secondary market operations on the relation between the auction price
and both investors’ bids (Implication 2) and the market price (Implication 3) is analyzed. If
the seller’s goal is to set the auction price equal to the concurrent market price, the diﬀerence
between these two prices should not depend on the level of secondary market operations.
However, the diﬀerence between the auction price and investors’ bids should be positively
inﬂuenced by secondary market operations, as the seller ramps up the aggregate demand
curve. Investors’ bids are summarized by the weighted average of all bids and the lowest
accepted bid in each auction.
These three diﬀerences are regressed on the level of secondary market operations and
the control variables. The results are reported in Table 6. The results are consistent with
the predictions. The ﬁrst and second columns exhibit that the share of secondary market
operations positively inﬂuences the diﬀerence between the auction price and investors’ bids,
whereas the third column shows that it does not increase the seller’s proﬁts. Taken together,
Table 5 and Table 6 suggest that the seller adjusts the extent of its discretion to the strength
of investors’ demand in order to guarantee an auction price equal to its marginal costs.
The key implication (Implication 4) from the basic model is that the ex-post measure
of bidders’ proﬁts, which is equated to the diﬀerence between the secondary market price
and the auction average of the winning bids, is independent of investors’ competitive bids.
Investors’ bids in each auction are summarized by three variables: a) average discount, b)
demand elasticity of the aggregate demand curve, c) demand, which is the value of all bids
submitted. The results reported in ﬁrst four columns of Table 7 are consistent with the
basic model. No signiﬁcant relation between the competitive demand and the proﬁts in each
18auction can be found. This means that the seller’s choice of secondary market operations is
governed by its marginal costs of supplying an extra unit of securities and is independent of
the prices for which investors are willing to buy these securities, the quantities they bid for,
and the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve. This contributes to the previous ﬁnding
that bidders in German Treasury auctions, unlike in most other countries, do not make proﬁts.
5.1.2 Non-competitive demand
The open question is how the seller uses its discretion in allocating to the non-competitive
demand. Under the null hypothesis of Implication 5, its proﬁts are independent of the amount
of non-competitive bids.
The empirical test is the same as that for the characteristics of the competitive demand.
The regression results are reported in the last column of Table 7. They show a negative
inﬂuence of the amount of non-competitive demand on the bidders’ proﬁts. The result is
highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level and it stands in strict contrast to the ﬁndings for the
competitive demand before. The seller uses the available non-competitive demand to increase
its proﬁts. At the same time the bidders’ proﬁts, and equivalently the seller’s proﬁts, in
German Treasury auctions are not distinguishable from zero, as shown in Figure 2. These
two observations suggest that the seller in German Treasury auctions uses the allocations to
non-competitive demand to increase the auction price and to match it on average with the
market price. As non-competitive bidders always have to pay the auction price, they receive
the securities on average for the market price and incur no losses across the auctions.
Further evidence for the use of non-competitive demand can be obtained by considering the
relative allocation of the residual supply to non-competitive demand and secondary market
operations. The residual supply is deﬁned here as the diﬀerence between the auction supply
and the allocations to competitive bidders. For the seller, it is advantageous for two reasons
to allocate the residual supply to non-competitive demand rather than to secondary market
operations. First, it can increase its revenues by increasing the price in a given auction.
19Second, it does not have to incur further transaction costs. The relative allocation to non-
competitive demand is therefore expected to be positively related to the ratio of the non-
competitive demand and the residual supply. In the regression analysis in Table 8, the
dependent variable is the share that allocations to non-competitive demand comprise of the
residual supply. This is regressed on the demand ratio and some control variables. The
results show that the relative allocations to non-competitive demand increase with the relative
strength of the non-competitive demand. If the non-competitive demand is strong enough,
the residual supply after the allocations to competitive bidders is preferably allocated to
non-competitive bidders.
The empirical analysis suggests that the seller’s price setting is governed by its marginal
costs of supply. The seller chooses the auction price independent of the competitive demand,
but not independent of the non-competitive demand. Allocations to non-competitive demand
help the seller to increase its proﬁts and set the auction price equal to the market price on
average, whereas allocations to secondary market operations only increase the auction price,
but not the seller’s proﬁts. On average, neither the seller nor the bidders make proﬁts in
German Treasury auctions.
5.2 Bid characteristics
There are two sources of uncertainty in German Treasury auctions to which bidders have to
adjust their bidding behavior. First, as in Treasury auctions in other countries and in any
common-value auction, bidders have to adjust for the champion’s plague. Second, they face
the seller’s discretion in determining allocation and pricing after the submission of the bids.
The bidders’ behavior is analyzed by examining all individual demand schedules in the 93
auctions between 1998 and 2002. Bidders in German Treasury auctions have a much larger
ﬂexibility in their bidding behavior than do bidders in most other Treasury auctions. As in
other auctions, competitive bidders can submit multiple bids and thereby determine their
speciﬁc demand curves. Beyond that, bidders in German auctions do not face any restriction
20in determining the relative amounts of their bids in the competitive and non-competitive
sector. Furthermore, they can even abstain from bidding at all. Therefore, it is important
to examine their willingness to bid in certain auctions, the distribution of their bids between
the competitive and the non-competitive tender, and their individual competitive demand
curves.
In the 93 auctions there is demand from 3,901 bidders, competitive demand from 2,996
bidders and non-competitive demand from 2,861 bidders. Bidders submit both competitive
and non-competitive demand in 1,956 cases and completely abstain from bidding in 1,886
cases. The question is how bidders use this substantial ﬂexibility in their bidding strategies.
Table 9 reviews the key bidding parameters and auction characteristics.
For the competitive bids, the results in Table 9 are broadly consistent with the results
of Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002). The ﬁgures show that competitive bidders
shade their bids. Bid shading is signiﬁcantly positive and increases with the duration of
the underlying auctioned security. Whereas it amounts to 0.021 for Bubills, it increases
monotonically to 0.149 for 30-year Bunds. The dispersion of bids also increases with the
risk of the underlying security, whereas the quantity demanded by the competitive bidders
decreases with the duration. Similarly, for the non-competitive bids, the demanded quantity
also decreases with the duration. Whereas the bidders’ non-competitive demand in Bubill
auctions averages at 4.21% of the supply, it decreases to 1.32% in auctions for 30-year Bunds.
The percentage share of competitive bids, which is the value of all competitive bids divided
by the value of all bids, does not show a clear pattern across the diﬀerent durations.
5.3 The bidders’ reaction to the seller’s discretion
Which factors determine bidders’ participation in certain auctions, the relative weights of
their competitive and non-competitive demand, and their levels of bid shading, dispersion of
bids and quantity demanded? Two factors deserve particular attention. First, the empirical
implication 6 emphasizes that auction size is an important proxy for the seller’s ability to use
21its discretion. Second, uncertainty in the secondary market is included to take into account
the bidders’ adjustment to the champion’s plague. This uncertainty is measured by the
implied volatility of the Bund future on the auction day.
The econometric speciﬁcation in Table 10 therefore is similar to that in Nyborg, Rydqvist
and Sundaresan (2002), but it also takes into account the speciﬁc ways in which bidders
in German Treasury auctions can submit their bids. Bidders ﬁrst have to decide whether
to participate in a given auction, either in the competitive sector, in the non-competitive
sector, or in both of them. Ignoring their participation decision and simply concentrating
on the analysis of the observed demand schedules, would lead to an inconsistent estimation
of the regression coeﬃcients. For this reason, a Heckman two-step estimation procedure
is employed to take into account this self-selection bias. The ﬁrst-step probit estimation
analyzes the determinants for the bidders’ participation decision in a given auction. The
explanatory variables are volatility, the size of the auction, and the duration of the security.
The latter is included in order to capture the systematic variation in the number of bidders
across maturities.
The results are reported in the lower part of Table 10. They conﬁrm that the maturity
of the security is signiﬁcantly positively related to the number of bidders that participate
in German auctions. More importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the results conﬁrm
the expectations for both auction size and volatility. The larger the auction size, the more
bidders participate. And the more volatile the market, the fewer bidders participate. Bidders’
tendency to abstain from bidding therefore increases with the uncertainty about their signals
and decreases with the bidders’ expectation of the seller’s use of discretion.
In the second step, the observed bidding behavior is regressed on the observed explanatory
variables volatility and size, and on the Inverse Mills Ratio that is obtained from the ﬁrst
step. The results are reported in the upper part of Table 10. The coeﬃcient for the Inverse
Mills Ratio is highly signiﬁcant for all ﬁve regressions. This means that it is crucial to take
into account the selection bias in the econometric setup.
22In rejection of Implication 6 - and in strict contrast to the evidence in previous papers
- the auction size is positively related to bidders’ aggressiveness. In larger auctions, com-
petitive bidders demand larger quantities, shade their bids to a lesser extent and decrease
the dispersion of their bids. The ﬁfth regression shows that an increase in size also leads
to a shift in demand to the competitive sector. This means that bidders fully use the ﬂexi-
bility given to them in German Treasury auctions and respond to an increase in size along
all possible dimensions. When size increases, more bidders participate in German Treasury
auctions. Participating bidders shift a larger share of their demand to the competitive sector,
and competitive bidders submit a more aggressive demand curve. These results suggest that
the bidders anticipate the seller’s discretion and rationally adjust their demand behavior to
it. They indicate that the seller’s use of discretion comes at a cost, as bidders react to it by
shading their bids.
The results for volatility are consistent with the champion’s plague and similar to those
in previous papers. Discount and dispersion are positively related to the volatility in the
market. Under uncertainty, bidders also reduce the aggregate quantity for which they submit
competitive bids. The fourth regression exhibits a lower demand in the non-competitive
sector following an increase in volatility. The last regression provides evidence that the share
of non-competitive bids is positively related to the volatility in the market. This means that
bidders use non-competitive demand as an alternative way of cautious bidding. The overall
results are consistent with the champion’s plague.
5.4 Competitive and non-competitive demand
The previous section shows the determinants across the auctions for submitting competitive
and non-competitive demand. The open question is how bidders, in general, split their
demand between the competitive and the non-competitive tender.
Bidders can always buy the auctioned security for a price β in the secondary market. The
auction price, which represents the weighted average price of all allocations, can therefore not
23be higher than β. This implies that competitive bidders can proﬁt even in auctions in which
the auction price is equal to β, if they submit a successful bid that is higher than or equal to the
lowest accepted bid and lower than β. More aggressive bidders are expected in particular to
use this opportunity. The following analysis focuses therefore on the simultaneous adjustment
of individual bidders’ demand schedules. Three dimensions for competitive bids are analyzed:
bid shading, bid dispersion, and quantity demanded. Furthermore, the quantity demanded
in the non-competitive sector, the overall quantity, and the percentage share of the non-
competitive demand are taken into account.
Following the methodology in Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002), bidders in a
given auction i are ranked by their quantity-weighted bidding price with
p1i ≤ p2i ≤ p3i ≤ ... ≤ pn−2i ≤ pn−1i ≤ pni
Subsequently, all the above mentioned variables are calculated for each of the ranked
bidders. This is repeated for all 93 auctions and ﬁnally the mean for each bidder rank across
the auctions is calculated. Table 11 reports the results for bidders with competitive bids and
for bidders with exclusively non-competitive bids.
Panel 1) analyzes the behavior of those bidders who submit a competitive bid. It shows
that the most aggressive bidders demand about twice as much as the least aggressive bidders.
At the same time, they only disperse half as much as the latter group. These results are very
similar to those found by Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002). Competitive bidders
simultaneously adjust their bidding behavior along all three dimensions: A more aggressive
bidder demands more quantity at a higher price and disperses his bids less than does a
less aggressive bidder. The most aggressive competitive bidders also demand much more in
the non-competitive sector than do the least aggressive bidders. Consequently, their overall
demand is signiﬁcantly higher as well. The demand share in the non-competitive sector is
slightly lower for the least than for the most aggressive bidders.
Panel 2) reports the results for the 905 bidders across all auctions who submit demand
only in the non-competitive sector. On average, their quantity demand share amounts to
240.0182, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the average for the group of the six least aggressive
bidders with bids in the competitive sector (t-statistic: 10.00) and even for the least aggressive
sub-sample within that group (t-statistic: 4.87). This analysis leads to the conclusion that
the bidders’ aggressiveness is positively related to their willingness to submit competitive
bids.
Further evidence on this can be obtained from a simple correlation analysis. The most
frequent bidders in German Treasury auctions are also the largest bidders, both in a given
auction and in all auctions over the sample period. The coeﬃcient for the correlation between
the frequency of participating and the overall bidding amounts to 0.66 and is highly signiﬁcant
(0.1% level).29 Frequent and large bidders bid relatively less in the non-competitive sector.
Both correlation coeﬃcients are again signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
5.5 Extreme uncertainty and auction outcomes
The sample period covered some extreme political, economic and terrorist activities. This
provides an opportunity to examine how the auction outcomes are inﬂuenced by the extreme
uncertainty and panic created by these events. Panel 1 of Table 12 provides the summary of
the results of the auction in August 1998 that was conducted at the time of highest uncertainty
(Russian Crisis/LTCM). Dispersion and, in particular, bid shading in this auction are an
order of magnitude higher than in the rest of the auctions in the sample. The bidders not
surprisingly make proﬁts in this auction.
Likewise, the auction on September 12 of 2001 shown in Panel 2 of Table 12 results in
extensive bid shading and dispersion of bids. There are however two remarkable diﬀerences:
First, bidders do not make proﬁts in this auction despite their bid shading. Second, the
average quantity demanded by each bidder in this auction is signiﬁcantly higher than in
the rest of the auctions. This ﬁgure suggests that only the largest bidders submit bids in
that auction. This is supported by the fact that the number of bidders in that auction is
29The same holds for the coeﬃcient for the correlation between the frequency of participating and the
average bidding amounts, which is 0.29 (signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level).
25signiﬁcantly smaller than in all other auctions. At the same time, the share of competitive
bids is signiﬁcantly higher. This is consistent with the earlier ﬁnding that larger bidders
tend to bid in the competitive sector. In general, uncertainty has two eﬀects on the share
of non-competitive demand: a) bidders shade their bids by demanding more in the non-
competitive sector, b) bidders abstain from bidding, in particular small bidders with a high
or even exclusive share of non-competitive demand. In the auction on September 12 of 2001,
the second outweighs the ﬁrst eﬀect.
The results illustrate that bidders ﬂexibly use the diﬀerent ways they are given in German
treasury auctions to adjust their demand. The result for the auction on September 12 high-
lights the dominance of competitive demand if only the largest bidders submit their demand
in an auction. It highlights that the seller can avoid giving away proﬁts to bidders even in a
situation of extreme uncertainty.
6 Conclusions
The paper provides evidence on institutional investors’ bidding strategies and the seller’s
discretion in German Treasury auctions. The analysis shows that the seller uses its discretion
to accomplish on average a market clearing price close to the secondary market price of the
auctioned security, without maximizing its revenues in a given single auction. The evidence
suggests that bidders do not make proﬁts in German auctions, while their bidding strategies
reﬂect the uncertainty created by the seller’s discretion.
The paper extends the framework by Lengwiler (1999) for auctions with variable supply in
the form of secondary market operations and non-competitive demand. It derives implications
for the seller’s and the bidders’ optimal behavior and tests them in the context of German
Treasury auctions. The empirical results are broadly consistent with the predictions of the
model. Analyzing the submitted demand schedules, the paper also conﬁrms and extends the
evidence on the champion’s plague as in Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002).
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Transactions in German Treasury securities on 93 auction days 
 
1)  Transactions by source 
 
  Number of transactions  Average transaction volume 
    (in € million) 
  BaFin  Deutsche Börse Merged BaFin  Deutsche Börse  t-stat 
1998 7158  -  7158  15.2  -  NA 
1999 4450 187  4450  20.4  5.5  3.88***
2000 3834  84  3834  28.0  9.2 2.44** 
2001 3615  61  3615  36.0  8.6  5.93***
2002 2119  37  2119  37.6  17.8 0.88 




2)  Transactions by security 
 
  Number of transactions  Average number of transactions Average transaction volume
    Before 11 am After 11 am Sum (in € million) 
Bubills 250  1.2  11.3  12.5 76.6 
Schätze   2239  17.1  100.6  117.7 63.7 
Bobls 3196 25.3  152.3  177.6 34.5 
Bunds 10   11684  73.8  353.9  432.7 23.5 
Bunds 30  3807  55.0  368.0  423.0 19.6 





Demand and allocation (in € million) 
 
C=Competitive; NC=Non-Competitive; SMO=Secondary Market Operations 
 
 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002  (6/12)  Total























































































Histogram of bidders’ profit in 93 German auctions (in basis points) 
  















Underpricing and trading volume on auction days 
 
Underpricing is the difference between the market price of the security at the indicated time 
and the auction clearing price. RT is the time where the auctions results are released. 
 
1) Underpricing and trading volume during different time periods 
 
Security  Time window  Number of trades Mean  Median Std  Max  Min 
          
Bubills  10:50 to 10:54  0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  10:55 to 10:59  1  0.0005  0.0005  NA  0.0005  0.0005 
  11:00 to 11:04  0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  RT to RT +4  7  -0.0028 0.0000  0.0043  0.0005  -0.0105
  RT +5 to RT +9  1  0.0000  0.0000  NA  0.0000  0.0000 
  End-14 to End-10  1  -0.0044 -0.0044 NA  -0.0044  -0.0044
  End-9 to End-5  0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
  End to End-4  68  0.0007  0.0040  0.0088  0.0180  -0.0270
          
Schätze  10:50 to 10:54  14  -0.0242 -0.0165 0.0267 0.0100 -0.0700
  10:55 to 10:59  12  -0.0221 -0.0200 0.0228  0.0100  -0.0810
  11:00 to 11:04  31  -0.0188 -0.0148 0.0224  0.0215  -0.0650
  RT to RT +4  141  -0.0046 0.0000  0.0110  0.0400  -0.0407
  RT +5 to RT +9  106  -0.0018 0.0000  0.0139  0.0400  -0.0400
  End-14 to End-10  3  -0.0253 -0.0410 0.0352  0.0150  -0.0500
  End-9 to End-5  2  -0.0042 -0.0042 0.0060  0.0000  -0.0085
  End to End-4  42  -0.0081 0.0000  -0.0905  0.1288  -0.5300
          
Bobls  10:50 to 10:54  14  -0.0174 -0.0200 0.0263  0.0300  -0.0645
  10:55 to 10:59  19  -0.0198 -0.0144 0.0281  0.0200  -0.0987
  11:00 to 11:04  49  -0.0065 -0.0045 0.0219  0.0500  -0.0908
  RT to RT +4  151  0.0041  0.0000  0.0610  0.5000  -0.0105
  RT +5 to RT +9  132  -0.0100 0.0000  0.0346  0.0500  -0.1300
  End-14 to End-10  3  -0.1653 -0.1210 0.1002  -0.0950  -0.2800
  End-9 to End-5  4  -0.0415 -0.0585 0.0364  0.0130  -0.0620
  End to End-4  29  -0.0456 -0.0200 0.1200  0.1750  -0.3500  
 
34 
Security  Time window  Number of trades Mean  Median Std  Max  Min 
             
Bunds 10  10:50 to 10:54  72  -0.0354 0.0000  0.1062  0.3100  -0.5000
  10:55 to 10:59  81  -0.0127 0.0000  0.0713  0.1467  -0.3000
  11:00 to 11:04  143  -0.0102 0.0000  0.0677  0.3600  -0.1700
  RT to RT +4  509  -0.0100 0.0000  0.0522  0.1760  -0.4900
  RT +5 to RT +9  827  -0.0166 0.0000  0.0494  0.1800  -0.2200
  End-14 to End-10  27  -0.0684 -0.0300 0.1833  0.2163  -0.3908
  End-9 to End-5  21  -0.0328 0.0200  0.2219  0.1700  -0.4200
  End to End-4  49  -0.0359 -0.0050 0.2267  0.4600  -0.5600
             
Bunds 30  10:50 to 10:54  31  0.0132  -0.0100 0.0764  0.2300  -0.1610
  10:55 to 10:59  30  0.0064  0.0000  0.0539  0.1900  -0.0800
  11:00 to 11:04  44  0.0157  0.0000  0.0684  0.1900  -0.0800
  RT to RT +4  208  0.0069  0.0000  0.0687  0.3200  -0.3900
  RT +5 to RT +9  174  0.0097  0.0000  0.0454  0.2700  -0.1100
  End-14 to End-10  2  -0.0052 -0.0052 0.0781  0.0500  -0.0605
  End-9 to End-5  9  -0.1146 -0.0400 0.3748  0.3500  -0.6900




2) Statistical test of underpricing 
 
Security Mean  Underpricing t-statistics 
 Bidding  Release  End  Bidding  Release  End 
Bubills -0.001  0.36 
Schätze -0.009  -0.003  0.007  1.35  1.19  0.63 
Bobls -0.001  -0.014  -0.051  0.20  1.51  1.61 
Bunds 10  -0.015  -0.010  -0.033  1.29  1.86*  0.69 
Bunds 30  0.004  -0.009  -0.088  0.84  0.38  0.75 






Determinants of Secondary Market Operations 
 
OLS Regression results: Share of SMO is the ratio of allocations to secondary market 
operations (in € billion) and auction size (in € billion). Volatility is the implied volatility of 
the Bund future. Size, € Demand, € C Demand, and € NC Demand are expressed in € 
billion. Duration measures the maturity of the security. Bubills are excluded because of the 
lack of secondary market operations. 
 
  Share of SMO 



















€ C Demand    -6.2*10
-12
(1.87)* 








2 0.126 0.132 





Price impact of Secondary Market Operations 
 
OLS Regression results: Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future. Size is 
expressed in € billion. Share of SMO is the ratio of allocations to secondary market 
operations (in € billion) and auction size (in € billion). Duration measures the maturity of the 
security. Bubills are excluded because of the lack of secondary market operations. 
 
 
Dependent variable = Weighted average of winning bids – 
 
 Weighted  average 
of all bids 
Lowest accepted 
bid 
Market price at 
11am 



































2 0.251 0.320 0.016 




Relation between profits and bid characteristics 
 
OLS Regression results: Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future. Size, € 
Demand, € C Demand, and € NC Demand are expressed in € billion. Discount is fraction of 




Dependent variable: Profit = Price at 11am - Weighted average of winning bids 
 
 Profit 




































Avg. Discount  0.5995 
(-1.25) 
     
Demand elasticity    8.8*10
-8
(0.01) 
    












2 0.030 0.013  0.058 0.0167  0.128 





Determinants of allocations to NC Demand and Secondary Market Operations 
 
OLS Regression results: Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future. Size is 
expressed in € billion. Duration measures the maturity of the security. DemandNC/(Supply - 
AllocationC) and AllocationNC/(Supply - AllocationC) are the ratios of demand in the non-
competitive tender/allocations to the non-competitive tender and the difference between the 
overall supply and allocations to the competitive tender. Bubills are excluded because of the 
lack of secondary market operations. 
 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 10 
Determinants of bid shading, dispersion, quantity and demand composition 
 
Discount, Dispersion, and Profit are fraction of face value, C and NC Quantity are fraction 
of auction size. % NC Bids is the fraction of bids submitted in the non-competitive tender. 
Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future, size is expressed in € billion. Duration 
measures the maturity of the security. The lower part of the table reports the first step probit 
estimates of the Heckit procedure, the upper part the OLS regression results for the selected 
sample. 
  
  Competitive Bidders  Non-Competitive Bidders  All Bidders 
  Discount  Dispersion C Quantity NC Quantity  % NC Bids 














































N 2996  2996  2996  2861  3901 
          






























Aggressive versus non-aggressive bidders 
 
In each auction, bidders are ordered from high (pn) to low (p1) according to their quantity-
weighted average bidding price. For each price level, the averages for Dispersion, C Quantity, 
NC Quantity, Quantity and Share NC are calculated across all auctions. The lower part reports 
the coefficients and respective p-values for the correlation between the price level and the 
respective bidding statistics. 
 
1)  Bidders with competitive demand 
 
Ordered Price Levels  Dispersion  C Quantity NC Quantity Quantity  Share NC
         
pn 0.0175 0.0852 0.0420  0.1271  0.2999 
pn-1 0.0183 0.0861 0.0225  0.1086  0.2865 
pn-2 0.0184 0.1175 0.0384  0.1559  0.2824 
pn-3 0.0218 0.0859 0.0326  0.1184  0.2554 
pn-4 0.0168 0.0563 0.0372  0.0935  0.3158 
pn-5 0.0195 0.0645 0.0225  0.0870  0.2322 
          
P6 0.0391 0.0544 0.0157  0.0700  0.2490 
P5 0.0322 0.0371 0.0079  0.0450  0.2138 
P4 0.0358 0.0563 0.0109  0.0672  0.2237 
P3 0.0419 0.0495 0.0090  0.0585  0.2133 
P2 0.0595 0.0347 0.0090  0.0437  0.2110 
P1 0.1459 0.0308 0.0045  0.0353  0.2274 
          
 Correlation 
Mean -0.1647  0.1877  0.2261  0.2350  0.1105 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002 
 
 
2)  Bidders with only non-competitive demand 
 
  Dispersion  C Quantity NC Quantity Quantity  Share NC





Response to extreme events 
 
 
1) Russian Crisis/LTCM 1998 : Bobl auction on 26 August 1998 
 
Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future, size is expressed in € billion. Discount, 
Dispersion, and Profit are fraction of face value. Quantity is the fraction of auction size. % C 
is the fraction of bids submitted in the competitive tender. Award to Top 5 is the fraction of 
the auction size awarded to the five bidders with the highest allocations. 
 
 
  Volatility  Size  Discount Dispersion Quantity % C  Profit  # Bidders Award to Top 5 
8/26/1998 5.780  5.129  0.2190  0.0675  0.0515 0.7339 0.075 46  0.434 
All other Bobl  5.135  6.141  0.0697  0.0354  0.0447 0.7930 -0.005 45.36  0.476 






2) September 11, 2001: Schätze auction on September 12, 2001 
 
Volatility is the implied volatility of the Bund future, size is expressed in € billion. Discount, 
Dispersion, and Profit are fraction of face value. Quantity is the fraction of auction size. % C 
is the fraction of bids submitted in the competitive tender. Award to Top 5 is the fraction of 
the auction size awarded to the five bidders with the highest allocations. 
 
 
  Volatility  Size  Discount Dispersion Quantity % C  Profit  # Bidders Award to Top 5 
9/12/2001 5.100  9.000  0.2210  0.0740 0.1460 0.9300 0.000  22.00  0.6811
All other Schätze  5.256  6.005  0.0407  0.0164 0.0643 0.8042 -0.010 41.94  0.5617
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